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Abstract
Algorithmic mechanism design (AMD) studies the delicate interplay between computational
efficiency, truthfulness, and optimality. We focus on AMD’s paradigmatic problem: combinato-
rial auctions. We present a new generalization of the VC dimension to multivalued collections
of functions, which encompasses the classical VC dimension, Natarajan dimension, and Steele
dimension. We present a corresponding generalization of the Sauer-Shelah Lemma and harness
this VC machinery to establish inapproximability results for deterministic truthful mechanisms.
Our results essentially unify all inapproximability results for deterministic truthful mechanisms
for combinatorial auctions to date and establish new separation gaps between truthful and
non-truthful algorithms.
∗Dept. of Mathematics, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel
†School of Computer Science and Engineering, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel.
‡Dept. of Mathematics, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel
ar
X
iv
:1
41
2.
62
65
v2
  [
cs
.G
T]
  4
 A
pr
 20
15
1 Introduction
Algorithmic mechanism design (AMD) studies computational environments in which the input to
the algorithm is provided by self-interested, strategic, parties, e.g., combinatorial auctions—the
now paradigmatic problem of AMD: m items 1, . . . ,m are being sold to n bidders 1, . . . , n. Each
bidder i has a valuation function vi : 2
[m] → R, which specifies i’s “maximum willingness to pay”
for every subset (“bundle”) of items S ⊆ [m]. The objective is to maximize social welfare, that
is, to partition the items between the bidders in such a way that the “social welfare” Σivi(Si) is
maximized, where Si is the bundle assigned to bidder i. A prominent line of research in AMD is
exploring the complex interplay between three natural desiderata: (1) computational efficiency; (2)
truthfulness, i.e., incentivizing bidders to reveal their actual valuations to the mechanism; and (3)
approximation guarantees.
Past studies expose inherent tensions between these desiderata and establish large gaps be-
tween truthful and non-truthful mechanisms in various environments, including combinatorial auc-
tions [10, 14, 26]—the paradigmatic setting of AMD. Yet, despite much effort along these lines,
long-standing questions remain wide open, including the “holy grail” [16]: designing a deterministic
truthful mechanism for general combinatorial auctions that matches the approximation guarantee
of the best non-truthful algorithm (or prove that no such mechanism exists). Beyond the contri-
bution of research along these lines to AMD, it also yielded ideas and insights that are of broader
interest. One example is the interesting connection between the VC dimension and optimization
over partial domains, presented in [26]. Papadimitriou et al. [26] showed how classical VC ma-
chinery (namely, the Sauer-Shelah Lemma [27, 28]) can be used to prove inapproxiability results
for deterministic truthful mechanisms in the context of combinatorial public projects. Subsequent
work further developed this idea in the combinatorial public projects setting [26, 6] and in the
combinatorial auctions setting [17, 7, 5, 21].
While combinatorial public projectsnaturally lend themselves to standard VC lower bound-
ing techniques, other environments pose a more a complex challenge. [17, 7, 5, 21] showed that
sophisticated adaptations of existing VC machinery, namely the Sauer-Shelah Lemma, can yield
inapproximability results for combinatorial auctions in a specific setting: VCG-based mechanisms
for “capped-additive valuations”. However, as combinatorial auctions deal with partitions of a uni-
verse (as opposed to subsets), it is not clear how standard VC machinery can, in general, be applied
to other auction contexts (general truthful mechanisms, other types of valuations, communication
complexity,. . . ).
We present a new generalization of the VC dimenstion that is both natural from a combinatorial
perspective, and encompasses the classical VC dimension, as well as past generalizations of the VC
dimension: the Natarajan dimension [22] and the Steele dimension [29]. While many previously
proposed generalizations of the VC dimension [27, 28, 22, 18, 4, 1, 9, 8] are motivated by machine
learning applications—proving positive results for classification—our generalization is aimed at es-
tablishing negative results in AMD, and is thus of a very different flavour. We prove a corresponding
generalization of the Sauer-Shelah Lemma that generalizes several known bounds [27, 28, 22, 18, 29]
and apply it to obtain new inapproximability results for deterministic truthful mechanisms and also
for simplifying and unifying existing inapproximability results.
1.1 Generalizing the VC dimension and Implications for Auctions
Recall the classic Vapnik-Chervonenkis dimension [30].
Definition 1.1 (VC-dimension). Let H ⊂ {0, 1}X . A subset S ⊂ X is shattered by H if
H|S = {0, 1}S. The VC-dimension of H, denoted V C(H), is the maximal cardinality of a subset
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S ⊂ X that is shattered by H.
The prominence of the V C dimension is largely due to the Sauer-Shelah Lemma [27, 28]:
Lemma 1.2 (Sauer-Shelah). For every H ⊂ {0, 1}X , |H| ≤∑V C(H)i=1 (|X|i )
Our generalization of the VC dimension relies on the notion of “shattering to k values”:
Definition 1.3 (k-shattering). Let H ⊂ Y X and k ≥ 2. We say that A ⊂ X is k-shattered by
H, if for every a ∈ A there is a set Ya ⊂ Y of size k such that the following holds: Every function
f : A → Y that satisfies f(a) ∈ Ya for all a ∈ A is a restriction of some function in H. That is,
∃h ∈ H s.t. f = h|A.
Putting it differently, for every choice of elements {ya}a∈A such that ya ∈ Ya, there is some
h ∈ H such that h(a) = ya for all a ∈ A.
Definition 1.4 (k-dimension). We define the k-dimension of H, denoted Dimk(H), as the
maximal cardinality of a k-shattered set.
This notion of (k-)shattering differs from past generalizations of shattering to non-binary do-
mains (see, e.g., [7, 17]). We present the following generalization of the Sauer-Shelah Lemma:
Theorem 1.5. For every H ⊂ Y X and for every 2 ≤ k ≤ |Y |,
|H| ≤
Dimk(H)∑
i=0
(|X|
i
)
(k − 1)|X|−i
(|Y |
k
)i
≤ |X|Dimk(H)|Y |kDimk(H)(k − 1)|X|
We point out that (1) taking k = |Y | = 2, we get the V C dimension and the Sauer-Shelah
Lemma [27, 28]; (2) for general Y and k = 2 we get Natarajan’s dimension [22] and the bound
in [18], which strengthen Natarajan’s bound [22]; and (3) for k = |Y |, we get Steele’s dimension
and bound [29]. Our proof of Theorem 1.5 (the generalized Sauer-Shelah Lemma) relies on a
careful application of techniques used for proving previous bounds (e.g., [29, 22, 18]) and appears
in Appendix A.
We now provide an intuitive exposition of the connection between our dimension/bound and
combinatorial auctions. We focus, for ease of exposition, on the class of VCG-based, a.k.a. maximal-
in-range (MIR) mechanisms, and on bidders with particularly simple “single-minded” valuations:
Each bidder i is only interested in a single bidder-specific bundle of items Ti, and assigns a value
of 1 to all sets of items containing Ti and a value of 0 to all other bundles of items. A maximal-
in-range mechanism has a fixed, predetermined, “bank of allocations” of the items to the bidders,
and for every input (reported valuations) outputs the best allocation in this bank. A trivial MIR
mechanism is the mechanism that always allocates all items to the bidder who values them the
most, i.e., the MIR mechanism whose bank of allocations consists of the n partitions of the items
of the form (∅, . . . , ∅, [m], ∅, . . . , ∅). A simple argument shows that the approximation ratio of this
mechanism is min{n,m}. We prove that this naive mechanism is essentially the best VCG-based
(MIR) mechanism: no VCG-based mechanism has approximation ratio m1− for any constant  > 0
unless NP⊆P/poly.
Suppose, for point of contradiction, that there exists a computationally-efficient MIR mechanism
M with bank of allocations H that has approximation ratio m1−. Observe that the allocations
in H can naturally be regarded as a collection of functions from [m] to [n] ∪ {∗}; every allocation
A ∈ H is associated with function fA that maps every item in [m] to a bidder in [n], or leaves the
item unallocated (mapping it to ∗), as in A. We now prove, via a subtle argument that utilizes
2
Theorem 1.5, that there exists a large (polynomial in m) set of bidders X and a large (polynomial
in m) set of items Y , such that all partitions of the items in Y between bidders in X appear in H
and, in this sense, H shatters the pair (X,Y ). We can now conclude that, as M optimizes exactly
over the allocations in H, M can compute the optimal allocation of |X| items to |Y | single-minded
bidders—an NP-hard task (this is, in fact, precisely the classical SET-PACKING problem).
While simple, this example illustrates the strength of our VC machinery with respect to past
utilizations of VC dimension arguments in the context of combinatorial auctions: (1) H shatters
a polynomial number of bidders and a polynomial number of items; and (2) every partition in
which all items in X are assigned to bidders in Y appears in H. Observe that shattering a constant
number of bidders (e.g., 2 bidders in [5]) is insufficient, as combinatorial auctions with single-minded
bidders are, in fact, tractable for a constant number of bidders. Also, if even a single allocation of
all items in X to bidders in Y does not appear in H, the reduction from a combinatorial auction
with |X| items and |Y | single-minded bidders is no longer possible (as the optimal allocation might
simply not be in M ’s bank).
1.2 Inapproximability Results
Our inapproximability results for combinatorial auctions are summarized in Table 1. Our results
are categorized in three dimensions:
Table 1: Inapproximability results for truthful mechanisms
Comp. Value Demand Comm.
All VCG All VCG All VCG All VCG
General m1− m1− - - ? m1− ? m1−
[new] [new] [new] [new]
Single- - m1− - - - - - -
Minded [new]
Submodular m
1
2
− m
1
2
− m
1
2
− m
1
2
− ? m
1
3
− ? m
1
3
−
[revisit 14] [rev. 14, 5] [rev. 10] [rev. 10] [new] [new]
Capped- ? m
1
2
− - - - - - -
Additive [rev. 5]
k-Dup ? m1− - - ? m1− ? m1−
[new] [new] [new]
The table only includes lower bounds that rely on the truthfulness of the mechanisms. All results
in the table are asymptotically tight, except the m
1
3
− bound for VCG-based mechanisms w.r.t.
submodular valuations. Question marks (“?”) indicate that there are no separation results between
truthful and non-truthful mechanisms. Minus signs (“-”) indicate that inapproximability results
for truthful mechanisms are irrelevant, either because of irrelevance of the model to the class of
valuations (e.g., communication complexity when valuations are succinctly described), or because
lower bounds for non-truthful algorithms match the existing upper bounds for truthful mechanisms.
• Representation of the “input”. We consider the two standard models for accessing the
“input”—the valuation functions—in combinatorial auctions: (1) the computational complex-
ity model, in which valuation functions are succinctly encoded, and mechanisms must run in
time that is polynomial in the input length; and (2) the oracle model, in which valuations
are treated as black boxes that can only answer a certain type of queries, and complexity is
measured in terms of the number of queries. Three types of queries are commonly considered:
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(i) value queries; (ii) demand queries; and (iii) the communication complexity model, in which
oracles can answer any type of query (addressed to a single valuation).
• General deterministic mechanisms vs. VCG-based mechanisms. The Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves (VCG) scheme for designing truthful mechanisms is the only universal tech-
nique for designing truthful deterministic mechanisms. While a naive application of VCG is
often computationally intractable, more clever uses of the VCG scheme provide the best de-
terministic truthful approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions to date [15, 19]. We
present inapproximability results for both general (unrestricted) deterministic mechanisms
and for the important subcategory of VCG-based mechanisms
• Classes of valuation functions. Over the past decade, much effort has been invested
in bounding the approximability guarantees of truthful mechanisms for different classes of
valuation functions of interest, including general valuations [19], submodular valuations [10,
14], single-minded valuations [20], capped additive valuations [5], and more. We present
inapproximability results for several well-studied classes of valuation functions.
We shall now briefly highlight some of the new results in Table 1:
Inapproximability for general deterministic mechanisms. We prove that no computationally-
efficient and truthful mechanism for general valuations can (asymptotically) outperform the trivial
m-approximation mechanism that bundles all items together and assigns them to the bidder who
values them most (in a 2nd-price auction). Specifically, for any choice of constant  > 0, there exists
a class of succinctly-described valuation functions such that (1) a non-truthful computationally-
efficient algorithm achieves an approximation ratio of m for this class ; but (2) no computationally-
efficient and truthful algorithm (mechanism) can obtain an O(m1−)-approximation unless NP
⊆ P/poly. Our proof of this separation gap between truthful and non-truthful algorithms relies
on the “direct hardness approach” [10] combined with a careful application of the Sauer-Shelah
Lemma.
Results for VCG-based mechanisms. We present several new inapproximability results for
VCG-based mechanisms. Our proofs of these results rely on lower bounding the Steele dimension
(yet another special case of our generalization). Our results establish, in particular (1) that the
best deterministic approximation ratio for general valuations is m√
log(m)
, obtained via a simple
VCG mechanism [19], is essentially tight; (2) a m
1
3 lower bound for submodular valuations in the
communication complexity model, improving upon the m
1
6 -inapproximability result of Dobzinski
and Nisan [12], obtained via a short and elegant proof that utilizes the Natarajan dimension (an-
other special case of our generalized VC dimension); (3) that no VCG-based mechanism can match
the approximation guarantees of truthful non-VCG mechanisms in combinatorial auctions with
single-minded bidders [20] and in combinatorial auctions with multiple duplicates of each item [3].
Unifying all inapproximability results for deterministic mechanisms. We show that es-
sentially all inapproximability results for deterministic truthful mechanisms in the combinatorial
auctions setting (to date) can be proved in our generalized VC dimension framework. Inapprox-
imability results that fit in our framework include the inapproximability results for (1) submodular
valuations in the value queries model [10]; (2) submodular valuations in the computational com-
plexity model [14]; and (3) capped additive valuations [5]. We believe that, in this sense, our new
approach marks the borderline of the state of the art and that further progress along these lines
must thus entail inherently new ideas.
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1.3 Organization
We discuss the connections between Theorem 1.5 and partitions in Section 2. We then explain how
our techniques can be applied to prove inapproximability results for VCG-based and unrestricted
truthful deterministic mechanisms in Section 3 and Section 4, resprectively. See Appendix for the
proof of Theorem 1.5, background on mechanism design and combinatorial auctions (Section B)
and a detailed exposition of our inapproximability results for truthful mechanisms (Sections C-F).
2 Shattering vs. Approximation
We now discuss the connections between Theorem 1.5 (the generalized Sauer-Shelah Lemma) and so
called “approximate-partitions”. We consider collections H of allocations of an item set X to a set
of indices Y . We will show that if H (even very loosely) in some sense approximates the collection
of all partitions, then there are large subsets S ⊂ X and A ⊂ Y for which all the partitions of items
in S to indices in A belong to H.
We first define the notions of shattering by collections of allocations (and in particular we ac-
commodate scenarios that involve duplicate elements). Then, we define two approximation notions
for collections of allocations, and prove shattering results.
2.1 Shattering Allocations
We extend the notion of shattering to allocations, which are more natural than functions in the
context of combinatorial auctions. Let X be a set of items and Y a set of indices. An allocation is
a pairwise disjoint collection {Sy}y∈Y of subsets of X. If ∪y∈Y Sy = X, we say that the allocation
is a partition. We denote the collection of all allocations of X to the indices Y by P (X,Y ). The
collection of allocations naturally corresponds to the collection of functions f : X → Y ∪{∗} (here,
f−1(∗) is the set of items that were not allocated to any index). We will freely alternate between
these two representations. We say that a collection H of allocations shatters a pair of sets S ⊂ X
and A ⊂ Y if all partitions of S to indices in A are induced by allocations from H. Namely,
Definition 2.1. Let H ⊂ (Y ∪ {∗})X be a collection of allocations. We say that a pair of subsets
S ⊂ X and A ⊂ Y is shattered if AS ⊂ H|S.
We wish to accommodate scenarios in which each item have d (identical) copies. To this end
we define:
Definition 2.2. Let d ≥ 1. A d-duplicate allocation of a set X to indices Y is a collection
{Sy}y∈Y of subsets of X such that every x ∈ X belongs to ≤ d subsets from {Sy}y∈Y .
Note that 1-duplicate allocation is just a simple allocation. We denote by Pd(X,Y ) the set of
all d-duplicate allocations. As with standard allocations, we say that a collection H of d-duplicate
allocations shatters a pair of sets S ⊂ X and A ⊂ Y if every partition of S to the indices A is
induced by H. Namely, we let H|S,A := {f : S → A|∃{Sy}y∈Y ∈ H ∀y ∈ A, f−1(y) = Sy ∩ S}, and
define:
Definition 2.3. (Shattering of allocations) Let H be a collection of d-duplicate allocations of
a set X to indices Y . A pair of subsets S ⊂ X, A ⊂ Y is shattered by H, if AS = H|S,A.
We will also use the notion of shattering of a single index.
Definition 2.4. Let H be a collection of d-duplicate allocations of a set X to indices Y . A pair
S ⊂ X, a ⊂ Y is shattered by H, if for every T ⊂ S there is f ∈ H|S,Y with T = f−1(a).
Note that if a pair S ⊂ X,A ⊂ Y is shattered then, for every a ∈ A, the pair S, a is shattered.
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2.2 Approximate Containment
Let X be a set of m items and Y a set of n indices.
Definition 2.5. Let H ⊂ Pd(X,Y ) be a collection of allocations and let α ≥ 1. We say that
H has the α-containment property if for every allocation {Ty}y∈Y of X, there is an allocation
{Sy}y∈Y ∈ H such that 1α percent of the non-empty sets in {Ty}y∈Y are covered by the corresponding
set in {Sy}y∈Y . Namely, |{y | ∅ 6= Ty ⊂ Sy}| ≥ 1α |{y | ∅ 6= Ty}|
Theorem 2.6. Let  > 0, H ⊂ Pd(X,Y ) and assume that n ≥ m1−3/4 and H has the m1−-
containment property. There exists a shattered pair S ⊂ X, A ⊂ Y of sizes Ω˜(m3/4) and m/4.
Proof. For the sake of simplicity, let us restrict our attention to the case that the number of indices,
n, is m1−
3
4 . We assume also that m
3
4 = mn and k := m

4 are integers.
Consider a random partition, {Ty}y∈Y , of X that gives exactly m 34 items to every index y ∈ Y .
Since H has the m1−-containment property, at least k sets in {Ty}y∈Y must be covered by some
allocation in H. Namely, there is some {Sy}y∈Y ∈ H such that Ty ⊂ Sy for at least k indices in Y .
In addition to the random partition, consider now a subset A ⊂ Y of k indices, chosen uniformly
at random and independently from {Ty}y∈Y . Since k indices must be covered (i.e. there is an
allocation in H such that the sets corresponding to these indices contain the sets sampled to these
indices), the probability that all indices in A (over the choice of both A and {Ty}y∈Y ) are covered
is ≥ 1
(nk)
≥ 1
(mk )
≥ m−k. Hence, there exists a (fixed) set A of k indices which are covered w.p.
≥ m−k when their corresponding sets are sampled at random (by the above distribution).
By conditioning on the set which is the union of the sets corresponding to the indices in A, it
follows that there exists a set S ⊂ X with |S| = k ·m 34 = m such that if a function f : S → A is
sampled uniformly at random among all functions with ∀i, j ∈ A, |f−1(i)| = |f−1(j)|, then w.p.
≥ m−k, it holds that f ∈ HS,A.
It follows that |HS,A| ≥ km ·m−k ·m−k (the term m−k is a lower bound on the probability
that a uniformly chosen function from S to A will satisfy ∀i, j ∈ A, |f−1(i)| = |f−1(j)|).
By Theorem 1.5, be have that |HS,A| ≤ (k − 1)mmDimk(HS,A). It follows that
mDimk(HS,A) ≥
(
k
k − 1
)m
·m−k ·m−k
≥
(
k
k − 1
)m
·m−2k
= eln(
k
k−1)m
−2k ln(m)
= eln(1+
1
k−1)m
−2k ln(m)
≥ e 12km−2k ln(m)
The last inequality is correct for large k since ln(1 + x) = x+ o(x). Taking logarithms we conclude
that Dimk(HS,A) = Ω˜(m 34 ).
2.3 Approximate Intersection
Let X be a set of m items and Y a set of n indices.
Definition 2.7. Let H ⊂ Pd(X,Y ) be a collection of allocations and let α ≥ 1. We say that
H has the α-intersection property if for every allocation {Ty}y∈Y of X, there is an allocation
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{Sy}y∈Y ∈ H that agree with {Ty}y∈Y on 1α percent of the items. Namely,∑
y∈Y
|Ty ∩ Sy| ≥ 1
α
∑
y∈Y
|Ty|
Theorem 2.8. Suppose n ≥ m 1k+1− and H ⊂ P (X,Y ) has the n1+2k -intersection property. There
is a shattered pair S ⊂ X, A ∈ (Yk) with |S| ≥ m(k+1)log2(m) .
We will use the following lemma from [7] (their lemma 5).
Lemma 2.9 ([7]). Assume that H ⊂ P (X,Y ) has the n1+2k -intersection property. There exists a
set S ⊂ X of size |S| ≥ mn such that |HS,Y | ≥ (1 + k)
m
n
Proof. (of theorem 2.8) For simplicity, we assume that n = m
1
k+1
− (otherwise, we will look on the
restriction of H to a fixed set of m 1k+1− indices). By lemma 2.9, there is a subset U of size ≥ mn
such that |HU,Y | ≥ (k + 1)mn . Applying theorem 1.5 we get that
(k + 1)
m
n ≤ mDimk(H)nkDimk(H)(k − 1)mn ≤ m2Dimk(H)(k − 1)mn
Taking logarithm we get a k-shattered set T ⊂ U of size log2(
k+1
k−1)
m
n
2 log2(m)
≥
m
n
2(k−1) log2(m) . Let {Ya}a∈T
be a collection of subsets of Y that indicates that T is k-shattered. Since there are at most(
n
k
) ≤ nk(k−1)2 possible options for each Ya, by the pigeonhole principle, there is a subset S ⊂ T of
size
m
nk+1
log2(m)
≥
m
m1−(k+1)
log2(m)
≥ m(k+1)log2(m) such that all the subsets {Ya}a∈S are the same and equal to some
A ∈ (Yk). This shows that the pair (S,A) is shattered.
3 Inapproximability for VCG-Based Mechanisms
We now show how our VC dimension arguments can be applied lower bound the approximability of
VCG-based mechanisms. Consider the classical combinatorial auction setting: m items 1, . . . ,m,
are sold to n bidders 1, . . . , n, and each bidder i has a private valuation function over bundles
of items vi : 2
[m] → R. The objective is to partition the items between the bidders so as to
maximize Σivi(Si), where Si is the bundle assigned to bidder i. A more general setting is that of a
combinatorial auction with duplicates, in which d identical units of each item are available but each
bidder desires at most 1 unit of each item. The mechanism can now output a d-duplicate allocation,
i.e., a collection S = {Si}i∈[n] of subsets of [m] such that each x ∈ [m] belongs to at most d of these
subsets.
A VCG-based, aka maximal-in-range (=MIR), mechanism has fixed bank of allocations H ⊂
Pd([m], [n]) such that the output of M for every n-tuple of valuation function v1, . . . , vn is an
allocation S that maximizes
∑n
i=1 vi(Si) over all allocations S ∈ H. Charging VCG prices from the
bidders ensures that such mechanisms are truthful.
We lower bound the approximability of MIR mechanisms in two steps: (1) using the machinery
developed in the previous section to show that a “good” approximation ratio implies shattering of
a large number of bidders and items by H; and (2) embedding a hard (e.g., NP-hardness, under
the Unique Games Conjecture, and communication complexity) problem in this shattered domain.
Step I: Shattering a large number of bidders and items (the VC step). Consider the
following two of the simplest classes of valuation functions:
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• Single−Minded (0/1): all valuations of the form v(S) = 1[T ⊂ S] for some T ⊂ [m].
• Additive (0/1): all valuations of the form v(S) = wTχ(S), where w ∈ {0, 1}n.
Intuitively, these valuations correspond to the containment and the intersection properties de-
fined in the previous section. Shattering is thus immediately guaranteed by the following corollaries
of Theorem 2.6 and Theorem 2.8, respectively:
Corollary 3.1. Let  > 0, and let H ⊂ Pd([m], [n]) such that n ≥ m1−3/4 and H has an ap-
proximation ratio of m1− w.r.t. single minded valuations. Then, there exist subsets S ⊂ [m] and
A ⊂ [n] of sizes Ω˜(m3/4) and m/4 that are shattered by H.
Corollary 3.2. Suppose n ≥ m 1k+1− and H ⊂ P ([m], [n]) has an approximation ratio of m 1k+1−
w.r.t. 0/1-additive valuations. Then, there exists a shattered pair S ⊂ [m], A ∈ ([n]k ) with |S| ≥
m(k+1)
log2(m)
.
Clearly, these corollaries assert that if mechanism M obtains a suitable approximation ratio
w.r.t. to any collection of valuations F that contains one of these two basic valuation classes, the
(appropriate) shattering bound holds.
Step II: Reducing from a hard problem. As the mechanisms considered are MIR, the mecha-
nism can optimize exactly over the shattered set of bidders and items—an intractable task for many
classes of valuations. We leverage this to prove both computational complexity and communication
complexity results. We next illustrate this idea in specific contexts. See our results in the appendix
for other classes of valuation functions. We prove the following theorem:
Theorem 3.3. No efficient MIR mechanism has approximation ratio m1− for any constant  > 0
w.r.t. single-minded valuations, unless NP⊆ P/poly.
Theorem 3.3 is a corollary of the following theorem for auctions with d-duplicates of each item:
Theorem 3.4. Under the UGC, for every constant d and every  > 0, no efficient VCG-based
mechanism achieves an approximation ratio of m1− w.r.t. single-minded valuations unless NP ⊆
P/poly.
Proof. Suppose that M is MIR and obtains an approximation ratio of m1− for combinatorial
auctions with d duplicates w.r.t. single-minded valuations. Let H ⊂ Pd([m], [n]) denote its bank of
allocations, and let S ∈ P ([m], [n]) represent single minded bidders (bidder i desires the bundle Si).
The approximation ratio implies that there must be some T ∈ H such that n ≤ m1− · |{i|Si ⊂ Ti}| .
Therefore, by corollary 3.1, there is a shattered pair B ⊂ [n], X ⊂ [m] of sizes m/4, Ω(m3/4).
We will show computational hardness by a reduction from the k-packing promise problem.
In this problem, the input consists of r sets S1, ...., Sr ⊂ U and an integer C > 0, and the goal is
to distinguish between the following two options:
• Positive: There are C sets in S1, ...., Sn that are pairwise disjoint.
• Negative: For every collection F of C sets out of S1, ...., Sn, there is some x ∈ U that is
covered by k sets of F .
Observe that setting k = 2 yields the famous ”SET PACKING” problem, which is known to be
NP-hard. We shall make use of the fact that assuming UGC, this problem is NP-hard for every
constant k. (The proof, based on [2], can be found in the appendix).
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The reduction is given by taking k = d + 1, and using the shattered X set as the universe U :
Given S1, ..., Sm/4 ⊂ X and an integer C > 0, suppose that each bidder i ∈ B desires Si, and all
bidders not in B have the zero valuation. Now, in the “YES” cases, since there is a collection of C
pairwise disjoint subsets from S1, ..., Sm/4 , and since the pair X,B is shattered and M is MIR, the
social welfare,
∑
i vi(Si), will be at least C. On the other hand, in the “NO” cases, it is impossible
to satisfy C bidders by any d-duplicate allocation, and therefore, the social welfare will be less that
C.
We prove the analogue of Theorem 3.4 in the communication complexity model. We first define
multi-minded valuations (0/1), which are are all valuations v : 2[m] → {0, 1}.
Theorem 3.5. For every constant d and  > 0, any VCG-based mechanism for combinatorial auc-
tions with d-duplicates that obtains an approximation ratio of m1− w.r.t. multi-minded valuations
must use exponential communication.
Proof. The proof of Theorem 3.5 involves a reduction from the communication approximate
disjointness problem and appears in Appendix E.3.
4 Inapproximability for General Mechanisms
We next describe our approach to proving inapproximability results for unrestricted deterministic
mechanisms. We illustrate these ideas by outlining the proof of a new separation gap between
truthful and nontruthful deterministic mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with general valua-
tions (see full proof in Appendix D). Our proof applies the “direct hardness approach”, introduced
by Dobzinsky [10] together with the VC dimension arguments.
We first define the specific valuation class that we will consider.
Definition 4.1. A valuation v : 2[m] → R is called k-local if there is T ∈ ([m]k ) such that, for all
S, v(S ∩ T ) ≥ v(S)− 1
2m2
v([m]).
For k = k(m) we denote that class of k-local valuations by k− local. The corresponding
bidding language will be circuits.
Theorem 4.2. For any  > 0,
• Unless NP ⊆ P/poly, no efficient truthful mechanism has an approximation ratio of m1−
w.r.t. m-local valuations.
• There is an efficient non-truthful mechanism with an approximation ratio of 2k w.r.t. k-
local valuations. Moreover, the auctioneer communicates with the bidders only trough value
queries.
We start by describing the efficient non-truthful mechanism.
Lemma 4.3. Algorithm 1 achieves an approximation ratio of 2k w.r.t. k-local valuations.
Next, we prove the second part of theorem 4.2. We begin by defining a class of valuations:
Definition 4.4. A valuation v : 2[m] → R is called almost single minded if there is T ⊂ [m]
such that ∀S ⊂ [m], v(S) = 1[T ⊂ S] + 1
m3
|S|.
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Algorithm 1
1: Input: Oracle access to k-local valuations v1, . . . , vn.
2: Output: An allocation {Si}i∈[n]
3: Initialize U = [m] and B = [n].
4: while U 6= ∅ and B 6= ∅ do
5: Choose i ∈ B that maximizes vi(U).
6: Allocate i a subset Si ⊂ U of size k with vi(Si) ≥ vi(U)− 12mvi([m])
7: Set B := B \ {i} and U := U \ Si
8: end while
These valuations will serve us in showing existence of a big menu for one of the bidders: Given
the valuations v−i of all bidders except bidder i, the menu Rv−i of bidder i, is defined to be all
possible bundles that may be allocated to i, that is
Rv−i := {T ⊂ [m]|∃vi for which T is allocated to i under the valuations vi, v−i}
We recall the taxation principle: Given valuations v−i, there is a nondecreasing function pv−i :
Rv−i → R+ such that the i’th bidder is allocated a set that maximizes vi(S)− pv−i(S) over all the
sets in Rv−i and pays pv−i(S).
Definition 4.5 (structured menu, [14]). Given valuations v−i, a number 0 ≤ k ≤ m and 0 ≤ p we
define the structured submenu S(v−i, k, p) as all the sets S ⊂ [m] with
• S ∈ Rv−i, |S| = k, p− 1m5 < pv−i(S) ≤ p
• For all T ∈ Rv−i such strictly contains S, pv−i(T ) ≥ pv−i(S) + 1m3
Lemma 4.6. Let M be a mechanism with an approximation ratio of m1− w.r.t. almost single-
minded, m-local valuations and assume that n ≥ m1− 12 . There exists a bidder i, almost single
minded m-local valuations v−i, and numbers 1 ≤ k ≤ m and 0 ≤ p ≤ 2 such that |S(v−i, k, p)| ≥
2
m
1
2 
2
2m6
.
We proceed by applying the Sauer-Shelah Lemma, which provides us with a subset of items
X ⊆ [m] of size |X| = Ω
(
m

4
)
that is shattered by some S(v−i, k, p). The fact that X is shattered
by a structured submenu with the same level of prices, allows us to solve a hard computational
problem by considering a valuation that relies on these prices. In order to define such valuation,
we extend the prices from Rv−i to all subsets of [m]. We do so as follows: Given T ⊂ [m], set
pv−i(T ) := minT⊂S, S∈Rv−i pv−i(S). We will need the following two facts:
Lemma 4.7 ([14]). Let M be an efficient truthful mechanism and let v−i be some valuations with
polynomial description. Then membership in S(v−i, k, p) and calculation of (the extended) pv−i can
be realized by a circuit of polynomial size.
We can now prove the second part of Theorem 4.2.
Lemma 4.8. No efficient deterministic truthful mechanism provides an approximation ratio of
m1− w.r.t. m-local valuations unless NP ⊆ P/poly.
Our proof of Lemma 4.8 relies on a reduction from VERTEX-COVER: Given a graph whose
vertices are the items in the shattered sets, we define the valuation vi such that vi assigns high
values to all vertex covers but, through the menu prices, makes covers of size ≥ t unattractive. We
then leverage the taxation principle to show that if there is a cover C of size t of U , the mechanism
will allocate bidder i a set T such that T ∩ U is a cover of size t.
10
Acknowledgements
Amit Daniely’s research was supported, in part, by the Google Europe Fellowship in Learning
Theory. We thank Subhash Khot for referring us to [2] and pointing out that the problem studied
there can be reduced to k-packing promise problem (see the proof of Theorem 3.4). We thank Guy
Kindler and Nati Linial for valuable discussions.
References
[1] N. Alon, S. Ben-David, N. Cesa-Bianchi, and D. Haussler. Scale-sensitive dimensions, uniform
convergence, and learnability. Journal of the ACM (JACM), 44(4):615–631, 1997.
[2] Nikhil Bansal and Subhash Khot. Inapproximability of hypergraph vertex cover and appli-
cations to scheduling problems. In Automata, Languages and Programming, pages 250–261.
Springer, 2010.
[3] Yair Bartal, Rica Gonen, and Noam Nisan. Incentive compatible multi unit combinatorial auc-
tions. In Proceedings of the 9th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge,
pages 72–87. ACM, 2003.
[4] S. Ben-David, N. Cesa-Bianchi, D. Haussler, and P. Long. Characterizations of learnability for
classes of {0, . . . , n}-valued functions. Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 50:74–86,
1995.
[5] Dave Buchfuhrer, Shaddin Dughmi, Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg, Elchanan Mossel, Christos
Papadimitriou, Michael Schapira, Yaron Singer, and Chris Umans. Inapproximability for vcg-
based combinatorial auctions. In Proceedings of the Twenty-First Annual ACM-SIAM Sympo-
sium on Discrete Algorithms, pages 518–536. Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics,
2010.
[6] Dave Buchfuhrer, Michael Schapira, and Yaron Singer. Computation and incentives in combi-
natorial public projects. In Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce,
pages 33–42. ACM, 2010.
[7] David Buchfuhrer and Christopher Umans. Limits on the social welfare of maximal-in-range
auction mechanisms. In Electronic Colloquium on Computational Complexity (ECCC), vol-
ume 16, page 68, 2009.
[8] A. Daniely and S. Shalev-Shwartz. Optimal learners to multiclass problems. In COLT, 2014.
[9] A. Daniely, S. Sabato, S. Ben-David, and S. Shalev-Shwartz. Multiclass learnability and the
erm principle. In COLT, 2011.
[10] Shahar Dobzinski. An impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular
valuations. In Proceedings of the 43rd annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, pages
139–148. ACM, 2011.
[11] Shahar Dobzinski and Shaddin Dughmi. On the power of randomization in algorithmic mech-
anism design. In Foundations of Computer Science, 2009. FOCS’09. 50th Annual IEEE Sym-
posium on, pages 505–514. IEEE, 2009.
11
[12] Shahar Dobzinski and Noam Nisan. Limitations of vcg-based mechanisms. In Proceedings of
the thirty-ninth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, pages 338–344. ACM, 2007.
[13] Shahar Dobzinski and Michael Schapira. Optimal upper and lower approximation bounds for
k-duplicates combinatorial auctions. Technical report, Citeseer, 2005.
[14] Shahar Dobzinski and Jan Vondra´k. The computational complexity of truthfulness in combi-
natorial auctions. In Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pages
405–422. ACM, 2012.
[15] Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan, and Michael Schapira. Approximation algorithms for combi-
natorial auctions with complement-free bidders. In Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual
ACM symposium on Theory of computing, pages 610–618. ACM, 2005.
[16] Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan, and Michael Schapira. Truthful randomized mechanisms for
combinatorial auctions. J. Comput. Syst. Sci., 78(1):15–25, 2012.
[17] Shaddin Dughmi, Hu Fu, and Robert Kleinberg. Amplified hardness of approximation for
vcg-based mechanisms. arXiv preprint arXiv:0907.1948, 2009.
[18] David Haussler and Philip M Long. A generalization of sauer’s lemma. Journal of Combina-
torial Theory, Series A, 71(2):219–240, 1995.
[19] Ron Holzman, Noa Kfir-Dahav, Dov Monderer, and Moshe Tennenholtz. Bundling equi-
librium in combinatorial auctions. Games and Economic Behavior, 47(1):104 – 123, 2004.
ISSN 0899-8256. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00184-2. URL http://www.
sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825603001842.
[20] Daniel Lehmann, Liadan Ita Oc´allaghan, and Yoav Shoham. Truth revelation in approximately
efficient combinatorial auctions. Journal of the ACM (JACM), 49(5):577–602, 2002.
[21] Elchanan Mossel, Christos Papadimitriou, Michael Schapira, and Yaron Singer. Vc v. vcg:
Inapproximability of combinatorial auctions via generalizations of the vc dimension. arXiv
preprint arXiv:0905.1995, 2009.
[22] B. K. Natarajan. On learning sets and functions. Mach. Learn., 4:67–97, 1989.
[23] Noam Nisan. The communication complexity of approximate set packing and covering. In
Automata, Languages and Programming, pages 868–875. Springer, 2002.
[24] Noam Nisan. Algorithmic game theory. Cambridge University Press, 2007.
[25] Noam Nisan and Ilya Segal. The communication requirements of efficient allocations and
supporting prices. Journal of Economic Theory, 129(1):192–224, 2006.
[26] Christos Papadimitriou, Michael Schapira, and Yaron Singer. On the hardness of being truth-
ful. In Foundations of Computer Science, 2008. FOCS’08. IEEE 49th Annual IEEE Symposium
on, pages 250–259. IEEE, 2008.
[27] Norbert Sauer. On the density of families of sets. Journal of Combinatorial Theory, Series A,
13(1):145–147, 1972.
[28] Saharon Shelah. A combinatorial problem; stability and order for models and theories in
infinitary languages. Pacific J. Math, 41(1):247–261, 1972.
12
[29] J Michael Steele. Existence of submatrices with all possible columns. Journal of Combinatorial
Theory, Series A, 24(1):84–88, 1978.
[30] V.N. Vapnik. The Nature of Statistical Learning Theory. Springer, 1995.
Appendix
A Proof of Theorem 1.5
Our proof of Theorem 1.5 (the generalized Sauer-Shelah Lemma) relies on a careful application
of techniques used for proving previous bounds (e.g., [29, 22, 18]). We explain the interesting
connections between this VC machinery and so called “approximate-partitions” in Section 2. We
use the following notation:
Definition A.1. For m ≥ d ≥ 0 and n ≥ k ≥ 2 let Mn,k(d,m) be the maximal cardinality of a
class H ⊂ [n][m] with Dimk(H) ≤ d.
Theorem 1.5 can be restated as
Mn,k(d,m) ≤
d∑
i=0
(
m
i
)
(k − 1)m−i
(
n
k
)i
.
We use the following recursive inequality:
Lemma A.2. For every 2 ≤ k ≤ n and m > d > 0 we have
Mn,k(d,m) ≤ (k − 1) ·Mn,k(d,m− 1) +
(
n
k
)
·Mn,k(d− 1,m− 1)
Proof. Let H ⊂ [n][m] be a class of k-dimension d with |H| = Mn,k(d,m). For every subset Y ⊂ [n]
of size k let:
• HY,1 be the class of all function f ∈ H such that f(m) ∈ Y and for every y ∈ Y there is
f ′ ∈ H such that f |[m−1] = f ′|[m−1] and f ′(m) = y.
• HY,2 be the class of all function f ∈ HY,1 such that f(m) = max(Y )
Finally, let
• H′ = H \
(
∪
Y ∈([n]k )
HY,2
)
.
Clearly,
|H| ≤ |H′|+
∑
Y ∈([n]k )
|HY,2| .
The proof of the lemma hence follows from the following two claims:
Claim 1: |H′| ≤ Mn,k(d,m − 1)(k − 1). Indeed, for every function f ∈ H′ there are at most
k − 1 functions f ′ ∈ H′ with f ′|[m−1] = f |[m−1]. Otherwise, there are k different f1, . . . , fk ∈
H′ that coincide on [m − 1]. This implies a contradiction as one of these functions belongs to
H{f1(m),...,fk(m)},2. Therefore, we conclude that |H′| ≤ |H′[m−1]| · (k − 1) ≤Mn,k(d,m− 1) · (k − 1).
Claim 2: for every Y ∈ ([n]k ), |HY,2| ≤ Mn,k(d − 1,m − 1). Indeed, we note that |HY,2| =
|HY,2|[m−1]| = |HY,1|[m−1]|. We also note that Dimk(HY1 |[m−1]) = d − 1. Otherwise, we could add
m to a d-elements subset of [m− 1] that is k-shattered to obtain a (d + 1)-elements subset of [m]
that is k-shattered.
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The next simple lemma calculates the values of Mn,k(d,m) for the pairs d,m for which the
above recursion inequality does not apply.
Lemma A.3. For every 2 ≤ k ≤ n and every m ≥ 1 we have
• Mn,k(0,m) = (k − 1)m.
• Mn,k(m,m) = nm.
The proof of the lemma is straightforward. We will upper bound Mn,k(d,m) in terms of the
numbers Nn,k(d,m) that are defined recursively as follows
Nn,k(d,m) = (k − 1) ·Nn,k(d,m− 1) +
(
n
k
)
·Nn,k(d− 1,m− 1)
With the initial conditions Nn,k(m,m) = n
m and Nn,k(0,m) = (k − 1)m. By lemmas A.2 and A.2
it is clear that Mn,k(m, d) ≤ Nn,k(m, d). Therefore, theorem 1.5 follows from the following lemma.
Lemma A.4. For every m ≥ d ≥ 1 and n ≥ k we have
Nn,k(d,m) ≤
d∑
i=0
(
m
i
)
(k − 1)m−i
(
n
k
)i
. (1)
Proof. We use induction on m+ d. We first deal with the cases d = 0 and d = m. The case d = 0
is clear. For the case d = m, we split into two sub-cases: n = k and k < n. If k < n then the
last term, in the r.h.s. of equation (1) upper bounds Nd,m. If k = n then the r.h.s. of equation
(1) counts the number of functions in [n][d], and therefore equal to Nn,k(d,m) = n
d. To see that,
suppose that in order to choose a function in [n][d], we first choose the pre-image of 1 and after
that, we assign values in {2, . . . , n} to the remaining points in [d].
We proceed to the induction step. After dealing with the cases d = 0 and d = m, we may
assume that m > d ≥ 1. Now, by the induction hypothesis and the definition of Nn,k(d,m) we have
Nn,k(d,m) = (k − 1) ·Nn,k(d,m− 1) +
(
n
k
)
·Nn,k(d− 1,m− 1)
≤ (k − 1) ·
d∑
i=0
(
m− 1
i
)
(k − 1)m−i−1
(
n
k
)i
+
(
n
k
)
·
d−1∑
i=0
(
m− 1
i
)
(k − 1)m−i−1
(
n
k
)i
=
d∑
i=0
(
m− 1
i
)
(k − 1)m−i
(
n
k
)i
+
d−1∑
i=0
(
m− 1
i
)
(k − 1)m−i−1
(
n
k
)i+1
=
(
m− 1
0
)
(k − 1)m
(
n
k
)0
+
d∑
i=1
[(
m− 1
i
)
+
(
m− 1
i− 1
)]
(k − 1)m−i
(
n
k
)i
=
(
m
0
)
(k − 1)m
(
n
k
)0
+
d∑
i=1
(
m
i
)
(k − 1)m−i
(
n
k
)i
=
d∑
i=0
(
m
i
)
(k − 1)m−i
(
n
k
)i
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B Background: Mechanisms and Combinatorial Auctions
B.1 Mechanisms for Auctions
In a combinatorial auction, m items are offered for sale to n bidders. Each bidder i ∈ [n] has a
private valuation function vi : 2
[m] → [0,∞) that is normalized (i.e. vi(∅) = 0) and nondecreasing
(if S ⊂ T then vi(S) ≤ vi(T )). A mechanism is an algorithm that takes as input bidders’ valuation
functions (either directly or via oracle access) and outputs an allocation (i.e., a collection S =
{Si}i∈[n] of pairwise disjoint subsets of [m]) of items to the bidders, and a vector of prices pi ≥
0 i ∈ [n] that each bidder has to pay.
We will consider combinatorial auctions under different assumptions on the valuation functions,
and also combinatorial auction with duplicates: d identical units of each item are available but each
bidder desires at most 1 unit of each item, and the mechanism can output a d-duplicate allocation,
i.e., a collection S = {Si}i∈[n] of subsets of [m] such that each x ∈ [m] belongs to at most d of these
subsets.
Important desiderata in this context are:
• Good outcomes. We seek mechanisms that provide “good” approximations to the optimum
social welfare, i.e., to the allocation S∗ = {S∗i }i∈[n] that maximizes the expression Σivi(S∗i ).
• Truthfulness (a.k.a. incentive compatibility). Under truthful mechanisms, a bidder
maximizes his utility vi(Si)−pi by reporting his actual valuation to the mechanism regardless
of other bidders’ reports (that is, truthfulness is a dominant strategy for each bidder).
• Tractability. We will consider both the standard computational complexity model and the
query complexity model (see Introduction).
Definition B.1 (Maximal-in-range (MIR)/VCG based mechanism). A mechanism M is called
MIR if there exists a bank of d-duplicate allocations H such that the output of M for every n-tuple
of valuation function v1, . . . , vn is an allocation S that maximizes
∑n
i=1 vi(Si) over all allocations
S ∈ H.
B.2 Valuation Classes and Complexity Models
Research on combinatorial auctions investigates the implications of different restrictions on valua-
tion functions. We consider the following classes of valuations:
• General: all (non-negative, nondecreasing and normalized) valuations.
• Multi−Minded (0/1): all valuations v : 2[m] → {0, 1}.
• Single−Minded (0/1): all valuations of the form v(S) = 1[T ⊂ S] for some T ⊂ [m].
• Subadditive: all valuations satisfying v(S∪˙T ) ≤ v(S) + v(T ).
• XOS: all valuations of the form v(S) = maxj wTj χ(S), where each wj is a vector in Rn+ (here,
χ(S) is the characteristic vector of S).
• Submodular: all valuations satisfying v(S ∪ T ) ≤ v(S) + v(T )− v(S ∩ T ).
• Additive. all valuations of the form v(S) = wTχ(S), where w ∈ Rn+.
• 0/1−Additive. all valuations of the form v(S) = wTχ(S), where w ∈ {0, 1}n.
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These classes form the following hierarchies [24]:
0/1−Additive ⊂ Additive ⊂ Submodular ⊂ XOS ⊂ Subadditive ⊂ General
and
Single−Minded ⊂Multi−Minded ⊂ General .
All inclusions above are strict.
A naive representation of the “input” to combinatorial auctions—the valuation functions—
requires specifying 2m numbers. In contrast, mechanisms are expected to be efficient in the natural
parameters of the problem: the number of bidders n and the number of items m. We consider the
two standard models for accessing the in combinatorial auctions:
• The computational complexity model, in which valuation functions are succinctly en-
coded and mechanisms must run in time that is polynomial in the input length; for single-
minded bidders, for instance, the encoding of valuation function vi is simply the bundle of
items bidder i desires.
• The oracle model, in which valuations are treated as black boxes that can only answer
a certain type of queries, and complexity is measured in terms of the number of queries.
Three types of queries are commonly considered: (i) a value query to valuation vi is a subset
S ⊆ [m] and the reply is the value vi(S); (ii) a demand query to vi is a vector p = (p1, . . . pm)
of “item prices”, and the reply is bidder i’s “demand” at these prices, that is, a subset S
that maximizes the expression vi(S)Σj∈Spj ; and (iii) the communication complexity model,
in which provide a unifying framework for essentially all existing inapproximability results
for combinatorial auctions to dateoracles can answer any kind of query (addressed to a single
valuation) and the complexity of the mechanism is measured in terms of the number of bits
transmitted.
C Approximation w.r.t. Valuations Classes
Definition C.1. Fix a collection of valuations F . Let H ⊂ Pd(X,Y ) be a collection of allocations.
We say that H has approximation ratio of α ≥ 1 w.r.t. to F if for every choice of valuations
{vy}y ∈ Y ⊂ F and every partition {Sy}y∈Y ∈ P (X,Y ) there is an allocation {Ty}y∈Y ∈ H such
that ∑
y∈Y
vy(Ty) ≥ 1
α
·
∑
y∈Y
vy(Sy)
It is easy to see that H has an approximation ratio of α w.r.t. F if and only if running MIR
mechanism using H as the bank of allocations have an approximation ratio of α w.r.t. F . We will
consider questions of the following type:
Question C.2. Given a collection F of valuation, what is the best (i.e. smallest) approximation
ratio α ≥ 1 for which there exists a collection of allocations with approximation ratio of α and no
large shattered pair of sets?
C.1 Single-Minded Valuations
Fix a set of items, X, of size m and a set of bidders, Y , of size n. In this section we consider
question C.2 when F is the class of general (i.e., nondecreasing and normalized) valuations or F is
the class of single minded valuations.
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Consider first that case that F is the class of general valuations and consider the allocation
class H consisting of all allocations that give all the items to a single player. That is, H consists of
all constant functions f : X → Y . It is not hard to see H does not shatter any pair A ⊂ Y, S ⊂ X
where |S| ≥ 2. Also, it is not hard to see that H has an approximation ratio of m (even min(m,n))
w.r.t. general valuations.
The following theorem shows that if we require bit more, that is, an approximation ratio of
m1− w.r.t. just single minded valuations, then we can already find a shattered pair A,S, where
both A and S are large.
Theorem C.3. Let  > 0, and let H ⊂ Pd([m], [n]) such that n ≥ m1−3/4 and H has an ap-
proximation ratio of m1− w.r.t. single minded valuations. Then, there exist subsets S ⊂ [m] and
A ⊂ [n] of sizes Ω˜(m3/4) and m/4 that are shattered by H.
The theorem follows immediately from theorem 2.6, as we note that H has the α containment
property if and only if H has an approximation ratio of m1− w.r.t. single minded valuations.
C.2 0/1-Additive, Submodular, XOS and Subadditive Valuations
Fix a set of items, X, of size m and a set of bidders, Y , of size n. In this section we consider
question C.2 for additive, submodular, XOS and subadditive valuations. Recall that
0/1−Additive ⊂ Submodular ⊂ XOS ⊂ Subadditive
and all the inclusions are strict. In [15] it is shown that there is a class1 H ⊂ P (X,Y ) with an
approximation ratio of m
1
2 (even min
(
m
1
2 , n
)
) w.r.t. subadditive valuations and with no shattered
pair S ⊂ X, a ∈ Y with |S| ≥ 3. Using this class [15] provided truthful mechanism with approxi-
mation ratio of m
1
2 w.r.t. subadditive valuations. As shown in [7], if we require bit more, namely,
an approximation ratio of m
1
2
− w.r.t. just to 0/1-additive valuations, we can find a shattered pair
S ⊂ X, a ∈ Y for a large set S.
As we show next, if we require a stronger approximation ratio, of m
1
3
−, we can find a shat-
tered pair S ⊂ X,A ⊂ Y with |A| = 2 and a large set S. This will be useful later to establish
communication lower bounds.
Theorem C.4. Suppose n ≥ m 1k+1− and H ⊂ P (X,Y ) has an approximation ratio of m 1k+1−
w.r.t. 0/1-additive valuations. There is a shattered pair S ⊂ X, A ∈ (Yk) with |S| ≥ m(k+1)log2(m) .
The theorem follows immediately from theorem 2.8, as we note that H has the α intersection
property if and only if H has an approximation ratio of m1− w.r.t. single 0/1-additive valuations.
Theorem 2.8 shows that if a class have a good approximation ratio w.r.t. 0/1-additive, we can find
a set of constantly many bidders A and a large subset S ⊂ X such that the pair S,A is shattered.
The following theorem shows that for arbitrarily good approximation ratio α > 1, there are classes
with an approximation ratio of α w.r.t. XOS valuations, with no shattered pair S,A where S is
large (say, super-logarithmic) and |A| = ω(log(n)). This indicates on limitation of the VC technique
for establishing computational lower bound on combinatorial auctions with XOS valuations.
Theorem C.5. For every l ≤ |Y | there is a class H ⊂ Y X such that
• H has an approximation ratio of ll−1 w.r.t. XOS valuations.
1This class is simply the collection of all allocations that either gives all items to a single bidder, or, gives at most
a single item to each bidder.
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• For l = 2, H has an approximation ratio of 2 w.r.t. subadditive valuations.
• There is no shattered pair S ⊂ X and A ⊂ Y with |S| ≥ 8(l−1) ln(n) and |A| > 24(l−1) ln(m).
Proof. For simplicity, we assume that l divides |Y |. Fix l ≥ 2 and let Y = {Yx,j}x∈X,1≤j≤l be
non-empty subsets of Y such that for every x ∈ X, Y = Yx,1∪˙ . . . ∪˙Yx,l. Define HY to be the class
of all functions f : X → Y for which there is 1 ≤ i ≤ l such that ∀x, f(x) 6∈ Yi. As the following
claim shows, for every Y, HY satisfies the first two conclusions of the theorem. Later on, we will
show that for some Y, HY satisfies also the last conclusion.
Claim 1. The following conditions hold:
• HY has an approximation ratio of 2 w.r.t. subadditive valuations.
• HY has an approximation ratio of ll−1 w.r.t. XOS valuations.
Proof. We prove the second part. The proof of the first part is similar. Let {vy}y∈Y be a collection
of XOS valuation and let {Sy}y∈Y ∈ P (X,Y ). We must show that there is {Ty}y∈Y ∈ HY with∑
y∈Y
vy(Ty) ≥ l − 1
l
∑
y∈Y
vy(Sy) .
For every 1 ≤ i ≤ l let {Siy}y∈Y be the allocation defined by
Siy = Sy \ {x ∈ X | y ∈ Yx,i} .
The allocation {Siy}y∈Y is contained in one of the allocations in HY . To see that, let f : X → Y
be any function for which f |Siy is the constant function y and f(x) 6∈ Yx,i for every x ∈ ∪y∈Y {x′ ∈
Sy | y ∈ Yx′,i}. It is not hard to check that f ∈ HY and for all y ∈ Y , Siy ⊂ f−1(y).
Therefore it is enough to show that for some i,∑
y∈Y
vy(S
i
y) ≥
l − 1
l
∑
y∈Y
vy(Sy) .
Indeed, we will show that for random i, the expected value of the l.h.s. is at least the r.h.s. To this
end, it is enough to show that for any fixed y ∈ Y ,
1
l
l∑
i=1
vy(S
i
y) ≥
l − 1
l
vy(Sy) .
suppose that vy(U) = maxj w
T
j χ(U). Let j
∗ be the index for which vy(Sy) = wTj∗χ(Sy). Now, we
have
l∑
i=1
vy(S
i
y) ≥
l∑
i=1
wTj∗χ(S
i
y) = (l − 1) · wTj∗χ(Sy) = (l − 1)vy(Sy)
where the left equality follows from the fact that each element x ∈ Sy appears in exactly l−1 many
Siy’s (namely, all i’s except the one for which y ∈ Yx,i).
Suppose now that for every x ∈ X, the partition {Yx,i}i∈[l] is chosen at random, uniformly from
all partitions of Y into l non empty subsets, each of which is of size |Y |l . Now, fix subsets S ⊂ X
and A ⊂ Y .
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Claim 2. The probability that the pair S,A is shattered is ≤ |S|ll|S| ( l−1l )|A|(|S|−l).
Proof. We say that x ∈ S is a bad point if for every 1 ≤ i ≤ l, A ∩ Yx,i 6= ∅. We note that if there
are l bad points, then the pair S,A is not shattered. Indeed, if x1, . . . , xl are bad points, then we
can choose for every 1 ≤ i ≤ l some yxi ∈ A ∩ Yx,i. It is not hard to see that there is no f ∈ HY
satisfying ∀i, f(xi) = yxi . Therefore, the pair S,A is not shattered.
It is therefore enough to bound the probability that there are less than l bad points. Indeed,
for every x ∈ S, the probability that A ∩ Yx,i = ∅ is ≤
(
l−1
l
)|A|
. Hence, the probability that x is
good is ≤ l ( l−1l )|A|. It follows that the probability that there are less than l bad points is
≤
l−1∑
i=1
(|S|
i
)
l|S|−i
(
l − 1
l
)|A|(|S|−i)
≤ |S|ll|S|
(
l − 1
l
)|A|(|S|−l)
By the claim, it follows that the probability that some pair S,A with |S| = m′ > 8(l − 1) ln(n)
and |A| = n′ > 24(l − 1) ln(m) is shattered is
≤
(
n
n′
)(
m
m′
)
m′llm
′
(
l − 1
l
)n′(m′−l)
≤ nn′m2m′+l
(
l − 1
l
)n′(m′−l)
.
Taking ln, and using the facts that 2l ≤ m′ and that for every 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 we have that ln(1 + x) ≥
ln(2)x ≥ x2 , we conclude that the ln of the last probability is
n′ ln(n) + (2m′ + l) ln(m)− ln
(
l
l − 1
)
n′(m′ − l)
≤ n′ ln(n) + (2m′ + l) ln(m)− 1
2(l − 1)n
′(m′ − l)
≤ n′ ln(n) + 3m′ ln(m)− 1
4(l − 1)n
′m′
= n′
(
ln(n)− m
′
8(l − 1)
)
+m′
(
3 ln(m)− n
′
8(l − 1)
)
< 0 .
Therefore, there is a positive probability that no such pair is shattered. Hence, there is some
collection of partitions, Y, for which HY satisfies the third conclusion of the theorem.
D General Valuations
In this section, we will show that unless NP ⊂ P/poly, there is no efficient truthful mechanism
for general valuations with an approximation ratio of m1−. We will even show that for every
 > 0, there is a class of valuations for which efficient non-truthful mechanism can achieve an
approximation ratio of m, but the approximation ratio of every efficient truthful mechanism is
≥ m1−. We will use the ”direct hardness approach”, introduced by Dobzinsky [10], together with
the VC dimension technique.
We first define the valuation class that we will consider.
Definition D.1. A valuation v : 2[m] → R is called k-local if there is T ∈ ([m]k ) such that, for all
S,
v(S ∩ T ) ≥ v(S)− 1
2m2
v([m]) .
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For k = k(m) we denote that class of k-local valuations by k− local. The corresponding
bidding language will be circuits.
Theorem D.2. For any  > 0,
• Unless NP ⊆ P/poly, no efficient truthful mechanism has an approximation ratio of m1−
w.r.t. m-local valuations.
• There is an efficient non-truthful mechanism with an approximation ratio of 2k w.r.t. k-
local valuations. Moreover, the auctioneer communicates with the bidders only trough value
queries.
We start by describing the efficient non-truthful mechanism.
Algorithm 2
1: Input: Oracle access to k-local valuations v1, . . . , vn.
2: Output: An allocation {Si}i∈[n]
3: Initialize U = [m] and B = [n].
4: while U 6= ∅ and B 6= ∅ do
5: Choose i ∈ B that maximizes vi(U).
6: Allocate i a subset Si ⊂ U of size k with vi(Si) ≥ vi(U)− 12mvi([m])
7: Set B := B \ {i} and U := U \ Si
8: end while
Lemma D.3. Algorithm 2 achieves an approximation ratio of 2k w.r.t. k-local valuations.
Proof. We first explain how to implement step 6 in the algorithm using only value queries. Given
a set U consisting at least k elements, we need to find a set S ∈ (Uk) with v(S) ≥ v(U)− 12mv([m]).
This can be done as follows. Simply, as long as |U | ≥ k, we throw an element x ∈ U that maximizes
v(U \ {x}). Since at each step we loose at most 1
2m2
v([m]), the total loss is ≤ 12mv([m]).
Next, we show that the algorithm indeed achieves an approximation ratio of 2k. Let S1, . . . , Sn
be an optimal allocation. Assume, w.l.o.g. that v1(S1) ≥ . . . ≥ vn(Sn) and denote OPT =
v1(S1) + . . .+ vn(Sn). Note that in the beginning of the j’th iteration [m] \ U consists of (j − 1)k
elements. Therefore, one of the sets S1, . . . , S(j−1)k+1 is contained in U . Therefore the value of the
allocation at this iteration is
≥ v(j−1)k+1(S(j−1)k+1)−
1
2m
OPT ≥ 1
k
k∑
i=1
v(j−1)k+i(S(j−1)k+1)−
1
2m
OPT
(here, we used the fact that v1(S1) ≥ . . . ≥ vn(Sn) and that vi([m]) ≤ OPT for all bidders i).
Summing over all iteration, and using the fact that there at most mk iterations, we conclude that
the welfare of the allocation returned by the algorithm is ≥ 1kOPT − mk 12mOPT = 12kOPT
Next, we prove the second part of theorem D.2. We begin by defining a class of valuations:
Definition D.4. A valuation v : 2[m] → R is called almost single minded is there is T ⊂ [m]
such that ∀S ⊂ [m], v(S) = 1[T ⊂ S] + 1
m3
|S|.
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These valuations will serve us in order to show existence of a big menu for one of the bidders:
Given the valuations v−i of all bidders except bidder i, the menu Rv−i of bidder i, is defined to be
all possible bundles that may be allocated to i, that is
Rv−i := {T ⊂ [m]|∃vi for which T is allocated to i under the valuations vi, v−i}
We recall here the taxation principle. Given valuations v−i, there is a nondecreasing function
pv−i : Rv−i → R+ such that the i’th bidder is allocated a set that maximizes vi(S) − pv−i(S) over
all the sets in Rv−i and pays pv−i(S).
Definition D.5 (structured menu, [14]). Given valuations v−i, a number 0 ≤ k ≤ m and 0 ≤ p
we define the structured submenu S(v−i, k, p) as all the sets S ⊂ [m] with
• S ∈ Rv−i
• |S| = k
• p− 1
m5
< pv−i(S) ≤ p
• For all T ∈ Rv−i such strictly contains S, pv−i(T ) ≥ pv−i(S) + 1m3
Lemma D.6. Let M be a mechanism with an approximation ratio of m1− w.r.t. almost single
minded, m-local valuations and assume that n ≥ m1− 12 . There exists a bidder i, almost single
minded m-local valuations v−i, and numbers 1 ≤ k ≤ m and 0 ≤ p ≤ 2 such that |S(v−i, k, p)| ≥
2
m
1
2 
2
2m6
.
Proof. For simplicity, we assume that n = m1−
1
2
. Given almost single minded valuations v−i we
denote by Sv−i all the sets T ⊂ [m] that the bidder i can obtain by biding with an almost single
minded valuation.
Claim 3 ([10]). • For every S ∈ Sv−i and every T ∈ Rv−i that strictly contains S, pv−i(T ) ≥
pv−i(S) +
1
m3
.
• For every S ∈ Sv−i, 0 ≤ pv−i(S) ≤ 2.
By this claim, it is enough to show that for some v−i, |Sv−i | ≥ 2
m
2n
m . Indeed, in that case, by
the claim, we have
S−vi ⊂ ∪0≤k≤m,0≤p′≤2m5S
(
v−i, k,
p′
2m5
)
.
By the pigeonhole principle, there is some S
(
v−i, k, p
′
2m5
)
consisting of ≥ 2
m
2n
2m6
sets.
Suppose toward a contradiction that it is not the case. Consider random almost single minded
valuations v1, . . . , vn sampled uniformly from all such collections for which each vi corresponds to
a set Si of size
m
2n and the sets Si are mutually disjoint.
Let {Ti}i∈[n] be the allocation given by the mechanism operating on these random valuations.
We say that the bidder i is satisfied if Si ⊂ Ti.
Claim 4. With a positive probability, non of the bidders is satisfied by a set of size ≤ m4 .
This entails contradiction since in that case there are at most 4 satisfied bidders, and therefore
the total welfare is ≤ 5. On the other hand, there is some allocation that satisfies all bidders, and
therefore its welfare is ≥ m1− 12 . This contradicts the assumption that the approximation ratio is
m1−. It is therefore left to prove the claim:
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Proof. It is enough to show that the probability that the n’th bidder is satisfied by a set of size ≤ m4
is < 1n . Indeed, given the sets S1, . . . , Sn−1, the set Sn is a random subset of X
′ = X \ (∪n−1i=1 Si).
Since |X ′| ≥ 12m, the probability that the n’th bidder is satisfied by a fixed set U ⊂ X of size ≤ n4
is at most
(
1
2
) m
2n . Now, since |Sv−n | < 2
m
2n
m , there are less than
2
m
2n
m potential such sets, and the
claim follows.
We proceed by applying the Sauer-Shelah lemma which provides us with a subset of items
X ⊆ [m] of size |X| = Ω
(
m

4
)
that is shattered by some S(v−i, k, p). The fact that X is shattered
by a structured submenu with the same level of prices, allows us to solve a hard computational
problem by considering a valuation that relies on these prices. In order to define such valuation,
we extend the prices from Rv−i to all subsets of [m]. We do so as follows: Given T ⊂ [m], set
pv−i(T ) := minT⊂S, S∈Rv−i pv−i(S). We will need the following two facts:
Lemma D.7 ([14]). Let M be an efficient truthful mechanism and let v−i be some valuations with
polynomial description. Then membership in S(v−i, k, p) and calculation of (the extended) pv−i can
be realized by a circuit of polynomial size.
We are now ready to prove the second part of theorem D.2.
Lemma D.8. An efficient truthful mechanism cannot provide an approximation ratio of m1−
w.r.t. m-local valuations, unless NP ⊆ P/poly.
Proof. Let M be a mechanism as specified. Fix almost single mined, m-local valuations v−i, k and
0 ≤ p ≤ 2 for which |S(v−i, k, p)| ≥ 2
m
1
2 
2
2m6
. Denote S = S(v−i, k, p). By the Sauer-Shelah lemma,
there is a set U ⊂ [m] of size m 4 (for sufficiently large m) that is shattered by S.
We will reach a contradiction by showing that this entails an efficient (non-uniform) algorithm
that detect whether a graph on the vertex set U has a vertex-cover of size t.
Consider the valuation vi = v
1
i + v
2
i defined as follows: v
1
i (S) = 6m
2 if S ∩ U is a vertex-cover
and 0 otherwise. While
v2i (S) =
{
3 (S ∈ S and |S ∩ U | = t) or (pv−i(S) > p and |S| > k)
0 otherwise
It is not hard to see that vi is nondecreasing, m
-local, and by lemma D.7 can be realized by a
polynomial sized circuit. Also, by the taxation principle, it is not hard to check that if there is a
cover C of size t of U , then the mechanism, operating on v1, . . . , vn, will allocate the bidder i a set
T such that T ∩ U is a cover of size t. This concludes the proof.
E Single- and Multi-Minded Valuations
Recall that single minded bidders are interested in a single bundle of items and are willing to
pay a fixed price for the whole bundle (or for any superset), and pay nothing in any other case.
Though simply defined and easily represented, these valuation are complex enough such that even
without requiring a mechanism to be incentive-compatible, one could not expect an approximation
ratio better than O(
√
m). On the other hand, one of the few positive results in this scenario is
a greedy algorithm [20] that obtains an O(
√
m)-approximation ratio while maintaining incentive
compatibility. One can verify that this greedy mechanism is not VCG-based, but still expect similar
performance from VCG-based mechanisms. Our first theorem asserts that this is not the case.
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Theorem E.1. For every  > 0, no efficient VCG-based mechanism obtains an approximation
ratio of m1− w.r.t. single-minded valuations, unless NP ⊆ P/poly.
In cases where there are d duplicate copies of each item, one might hope to boost up the poor
performance of mechanisms, predicated by the above theorem. Indeed, a mechanism devised by
Bartal et al. [3], is both incentive compatible, have an approximation ratio of dm
1
d−2 , and efficient
whenever demand queries can be carried out efficiently (in particular, it is efficient for single minded
bidders).
Once again, one might hope that the universal technique of VCG-based mechanisms can achieve
similar (or even better) approximation ratios. A generalization of theorem E.1 shows that it is
impossible.
Theorem E.2. Assuming the UGC, for every constant d and every  > 0, no efficient VCG-based
mechanism with d duplicates have an approximation ratio of m1− w.r.t. single-minded valuations,
unless NP ⊆ P/poly.
Single minded valuations, are thus computationally hard to deal with, while trivial from a
communicational perspective - only O(m) bits are required to encode each valuation. Considering
not one, but several bundles of items, changes the picture:
Theorem E.3. For every constant d and  > 0, if a VCG-based mechanism for combinatorial
auctions with d-duplicates obtains an approximation ratio of m1− w.r.t. multi-minded valuations,
it must use exponential communication.
E.1 Single-Minded Computational Bound – Proof of Theorem E.2
Suppose that M is VCG-based, and obtains an approximation ratio of m1− for combinatorial
auctions with d duplicates w.r.t. single-minded valuations. Let H ⊂ Pd([m], [n]) denote its bank
of allocations, and let S ∈ P ([m], [n]) represent single minded bidders (bidder i desires the bundle
Si). The approximation ratio implies that must be some T ∈ H such that
n ≤ m1− · |{i|Si ⊂ Ti}| .
Therefore, by theorem 3.1, there is a shattered pair B ⊂ [n], X ⊂ [m] of sizes m/4, Ω(m3/4).
We will show computational hardness by a reduction from the k-packing promise problem.
In this problem, the input consists of r sets S1, ...., Sr ⊂ U and an integer C > 0, and the goal is
to distinguish between the following two options:
• Positive: There are C sets in S1, ...., Sn that are pairwise disjoint.
• Negative: For every collection F of C sets out of S1, ...., Sn, there is some x ∈ U that is
covered by k sets of F .
Observe that setting k = 2 yields the famous ”set packing” problem, which is known to be NP-hard.
We shall make use of the fact that assuming UGC, this problem is NP-hard for every constant k.
(The proof, based on [2], can be found in the appendix).
The reduction is given by taking k = d + 1, and using the shattered X set as the universe U :
Given S1, ..., Sm/4 ⊂ X and an integer C > 0, suppose that each bidder i ∈ B desires Si, and all
bidders not in B have the zero valuation. Now, in the “yes” cases, since there is a collection of C
pairwise disjoint subsets from S1, ..., Sm/4 , and since the pair X,B is shattered and M is MIR, the
social welfare,
∑
i vi(Si), will be at least C. On the other hand, in the “NO” cases, it is impossible
to satisfy C bidders by any d-duplicate allocation, and therefore, the social welfare will be less that
C.
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E.2 Multi-Minded Communication Bound – Proof of Theorem E.3
Definition E.4. Let F = {As}ts=1 be a collection of partitions such that each As partition the
universe X into k sets. We say that F has the k-wise intersection property if for every choice of k
indices 1 ≤ s1, ..., sk ≤ t, we have ∩ki=1Asii = ∅ if and only if s1 = . . . = sk.
The following lemma asserts that a large collection of partitions with such intersection property
exists.
Lemma E.5 (essentially [13]). There exists a collection of partitions F = {As}ts=1 of the set X
into k sets, such that |F| = t = e
|X|
kk+1 , and F has the k-wise intersection property holds.
Proof. We use a probabilistic construction: Choose each partition As independently at random
(that is, each element in X will be placed in Asj with equal probability). Fix k indices 1 ≤
s1, ..., sk ≤ t at least two of which are different. We have that
Pr[∩ki=1Asii = ∅] =
|X|∏
j=1
Pr[j /∈ ∩ki=1Asii ] ≤
(
1− 1
kk
)|X|
≤ e−
|X|
kk
As there are at most tk choices of indices, using the union bound we conclude that as long as
tk < e
|X|
kk such a collection of partitions exists.
Proof. (of Theorem E.3). Suppose that M is VCG-based, and obtains an approximation ratio of
m1− for combinatorial auctions with d duplicates w.r.t. multi-minded valuations. Let H denote its
bank of allocations. As single-minded valuations contained in this class, H shatters a pair of subsets
B ⊂ [n], X ⊂ [m] of sizes d + 1, Ω(m/2). Applying Lemma E.5, yields a collection of partitions
F = {Ds}ts=1 ⊂ P (X,B) of size t = em
1
2 ·/(d+1)d+2 which satisfy the (d + 1)-wise intersection
property.
We now use this collection of partitions in order to show a reduction from the approximate
disjointness problem: This problem deals with r players, each of which holds a t-bit string that
specify a subset Ai ⊆ {1, ..., t}. The players are required to distinguish between the following two
extreme cases:
• Positive: ∩ri=1Ai 6= ∅.
• Negative: Ai ∩Aj = ∅ for all 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ r.
The communication complexity of the approximate disjointness problem is known to be Ω
(
t
r4
)
[23]. The reduction is given as follows: Suppose that each of the bidders in B holds a subset
Ai ⊂ {1, . . . , t} which determines the multi-minded valuation
vi(T ) =
{
1, ∃s ∈ Ai s.t. Dsi ⊆ T
0, else
Observe that if ∩ri=1Ai 6= ∅, indicated by some s ∈ ∩ri=1Ai, then the allocation As satisfies all
bidders in B, and since the pair B,X is shattered, the social welfare will be d+ 1.
On the other hand, if Ai ∩ Aj = ∅ for all 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ r, then it is not hard to see that it is
impossible to satisfy all the bidders in B by any d-duplicate allocation, and therefore, the social
welfare will be ≤ k.
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We conclude that simulating these valuations (and zero valuations for all bidders not in B)
solves the approximate disjointness problem, and the communication complexity of M is therefore
Ω
(
t
(d+ 1)4
)
= Ω
em 12 ·/(d+1)d+2
(d+ 1)4

which proves the claim.
F Submodular valuations
In this section we sketch four lower bounds for submodular valuations and subclasses of submodular
valuations. This demonstrate the power and generality of the VC technique, as we show how to
prove under this framework three known results and one that strengthen a previous result of [12].
Besides unification, the proofs sketched here are somewhat simpler. In particular, theorem F.1 that
substantially simplifies (and strengthen) [12]
F.1 Communication lower bounds on VGC mechanisms
Theorem F.1. For every  > 0, if a VCG-based mechanism have an approximation ratio of m
1
3
−
w.r.t. submodular valuations, it must use exponential communication.
This result strengthen a similar result due to [12], who showed VCG mechanisms with ap-
proximation ratio of m
1
6
− w.r.t. submodular valuations must use exponential communication. In
addition, the proof sketched here is substantially simpler.
Proof. (sketch) Let M be a VCG mechanism having an approximation ratio of m
1
3
− w.r.t. sub-
modular valuations. Let H ⊂ P ([m], [n]) be its bank of allocations. Using theorem C.4, we can
find a shattered pair S,A where |S| ≥ m and |A| = 2. Now, assume that all the players besides
the players in A := {1, 2} have the zero valuation, and the valuations of the bidders in A depends
only on the items in S.
The output of the mechanism induce an allocation of S = A1∪˙A2 that maximizes v1(A1) +
v2(A2). Therefore, the problem finding an allocation that maximizes the sum of two submodular
functions can be solved using the mechanism. Since the solution of this problem requires exponential
communication [25] the theorem follows.
F.2 Computational and value queries lower bounds
Theorem F.2. For any  > 0, unless NP ⊆ P/poly, no efficient truthful mechanism has an
approximation ratio of m
1
2
− w.r.t. submodular valuations.
Theorem F.3. For any  > 0 any truthful mechanism that communicates with the bidders only
by value queries, and has an approximation ratio of m
1
2
− w.r.t. submodular valuations, must use
exponentially many value queries.
The first theorem was proved by [14] under the weaker assumption that NP 6= P . The second
theorem was proved by [10]. The proof sketched here is close to the proofs in [10, 14], but the step
of embedding a hard problem given a “large menu” is somewhat simplified.
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Proof. (of theorems F.2 and F.3 – sketch) We will use the terminology of section D. Assume
n = m
1
2
−. Let M be a truthful mechanism with approximation ratio m
1
2
− w.r.t. submodular
valuations. By lemma 2.3 in [14], there is 1 ≤ k ≤ m, 0 ≤ p ≤ m and additive valuations v−i for
which |S(v−i, k, p)| ≥ em
2
10m8
. Denote S = S(v−i, k, p). By the Sauer-Shelah lemma, S shatters a
set U ⊂ [m] of size ≥ m (for large enough m). Given collection B of subsets of S, consider the
following valuation
vi(S) =

t|S| |S| < k
tk |S| = k, S ∈ S and S ∩ U ∈ B
tk − 1
m4
|S| = k, S ∈ S and S ∩ U 6∈ B
t(k − 2−k) |S| = k and S 6∈ S
t(k − 2−|S|) |S| > k and pv−i(S) < p+ 1m5
tk |S| > k and pv−i(S) ≥ p+ 1m5
It is not hard to check that vi is nondecreasing, normalized and submodular for every t ≥ 1. Also,
by the taxation principle, for sufficiently large t, if the mechanism operates on vi, v−i then it will
allocate the bidder i a sets S ∈ S such that S ∩ U ∈ B (provided that such a set exists).
We now split the proof into two proofs (one for theorem F.2 and the other for theorem F.3).
Theorem F.3: We note that given, v−i,S and a value query access to the (characteristic function
of the) collection B, it is possible to simulate a value query to vi by a single value query to B.
Therefore, the mechanism can be used to solve the following problem: Given a value query access
to B, determine whether B is empty. It is clear that the query complexity of this last problem is
2|U | − 1, and therefore, the query complexity of M is at least 2|U | − 1 ≥ 2m − 1.
Theorem F.2: We note that if membership in B can be evaluated by a polynomial sized circuit,
then, by lemma D.7, vi can be also realized by a polynomial sized circuit. Using this fact, it is not
hard to show a (non-uniform) polynomial time algorithm for, say, MAXCUT. Given a graph on
the vertices U and a number r, we will define B as the collection of all subsets S ⊂ U such that
the cut (S,U \ S) consists of ≥ k edges. By running the mechanism with vi corresponding to this
B, we will be able to efficiently identify whether the graph has a cut of size ≥ k.
F.3 Computational lower bounds on capped additive valuations
Our next result considers the class of valuations known as capped-additive (or budget-additive),
where a bidder has an additive valuation over the items, together with a restriction on the maximal
total price she is willing to pay.
Definition F.4. A valuation function v is said to be a capped-additive if there exist an additive
valuation a and a real value B, such that for every bundle S ⊂ [m], v(S) = min{a(S), B}.
Theorem F.5. Let  > 0. There is no polynomial-time VCG mechanism with an approximation
ratio of m0.5− w.r.t. capped additive valuations unless NP ⊂ P/poly.
This theorem have been proved in [21, 5, 7, 17], which first applied the notion of VC dimension
in order to lower-bound the performance of mechanisms. The proof presented here somewhat
simplifies the step of finding a shattered set.
Proof. (sketch) First, observe that capped additive valuations strictly contains additive valuations.
Hence, the existence of such a mechanism M together with theorem C.4 implies that its bank
of allocations H shatters a pair A ∈ ([n]2 ), S ⊂ [m] with, |S| ≥ m/4. This allows us to embed
SUBSET-SUM (see [7]), and computaional hardness follows.
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G Hardness of the k-packing promise problem
Recall that the k-packing promise problem is the following. The input consists of r sets
S1, ...., Sr ⊂ U and an integer C > 0, and the goal is to distinguish between the following two
options:
• Positive: There are C sets in S1, ...., Sn that are pairwise disjoint.
• Negative: For every collection F of C sets out of S1, ...., Sn, there is some x ∈ U that is
covered by k sets of F .
Theorem G.1. For every constant k, the k-packing promise problem is UGC-hard.
Proof. We shall use a reduction from the following promise problem: Given a k-uniform hypergraph
G = (V,E), one should distinguish between the following cases:
• Yes case: there exists V ′ ⊂ V , satisfying |V ′| ≥ 12k |V |, such that no hyper-edge contains two
or more vertices from V ′.
• No case: every set V ′ of size ≥ 12k |V | contains an edge.
This problem (actually, a more general one) was shown to be UGC-hard in [2]. The reduction
to the k-packing promise problem is given by referring to the hyper-edges as the elements of the
universe. For each vertex i ∈ V define Si to be the set of all hyper-edges that contain i. Finally,
let C = 12k |V |.
It is straight-forward to verify that this defines a valid reduction to the k-packing promise
problem.
H Open Questions
Inapproximability results for deterministic truthful mechanisms. As Table 1 shows, im-
portant questions about the approximability of deterministic truthful mechanisms remain open, in-
cluding the approximability of general truthful mechanisms for general and submodular valuations
in the communication complexity model, and the approximability of general truthful mechanisms
for capped-additive (and other classes of succinctly-described valuations) in the computational
complexity model.
Inapproximability results for randomized truthful mechanisms. We applied VC machin-
ery to establish lower bounds for deterministic mechanisms. What about randomized mecha-
nisms? Consider, e.g., the subclass of truthful mecahnisms that are maximal in distributional
range (MIDR [11]), i.e., always output the best probability distribution over outcomes in a pre-
determined set of probability distributions (that need not contain all distributions). Can VC
machinery be extended to prove lower bounds for MIDR (as with MIR)?
Optimization over partial domains. SATL is an example of an interesting, and largely unex-
plored, class of problems in complexity theory: optimization over “partial domains”, i.e., when the
space of possible solutions is (potentially) incomplete. Intuitively, any NP-hard problem remains
hard so long as the space of solutions is “large”. Our results here can, from this perspective, be
regarded as providing the means for proving this in the context of set-packing problems. Partial-
domain variants of other classical problems seem to require new machinery Consider, e.g., k-SET-
COVER, in which the input is a collection of subsets S1, . . . , Sn of and the goal is to determine
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whether U can be covered by k of these subsets. What about k-SET-COVERL, in which the indices
of the k subsets must now belong to some large predetermined set L ⊆ [n]k?
Tight bounds for the new dimension. We observe that when k = n the bound of Theorem 1.5
is tight for every choice of d,m. To see this, fix m ≥ d ≥ 0 and n ≥ k ≥ 2 and onsider the class
H ⊂ [n][m] consisting of all functions f : [m] → [n] for which |{x | f(x) ≥ k}| ≤ d. Now, observe
that Dimk(H) = d and
|H| =
d∑
i=0
(
m
i
)
(k − 1)n−i(n+ 1− k)i .
However, if k < n the bounds derived from Theorem 1.5 are loose. Sharpening the upper/lower
bounds is left for future research.
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